Is the male marriage premium due to selection? The effect of shotgun weddings on the return to marriage by Donna Ginther & Madeline Zavodny
The authors thank McKinley Blackburn, Eleanor Brown, Chris Cornwell, and participants at the Western Economic
Association and Southern Economic Association meetings for helpful comments. The views expressed here are the
authors’ and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta or the Federal Reserve System. Any remaining
errors are the authors’ responsibility.
Please address questions regarding content to Madeline Zavodny, Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of
Atlanta, 104 Marietta Street, NW, Atlanta, Georgia 30303-2713, 404/521-8977, 404/521-8058 (fax), madeline.
zavodny@atl.frb.org, or Donna Ginther, Department of Economics, Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri 63130,
314/935-6607, 314/935-4156 (fax), dginther@wuecona.wustl.edu.
To receive notification about new papers or to order copies of printed papers, contact the Public Affairs Department,
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 104 Marietta Street, NW, Atlanta, Georgia 30303-2713, 404/521-8020. The full text
of this paper may be downloaded (in PDF format) from the Atlanta Fed’s World-Wide Web site at www.
frbatlanta.org/publica/work_papers/.
Is the Male Marriage Premium Due to Selection?
The Effect of Shotgun Weddings on the Return to Marriage
Donna Ginther and Madeline Zavodny




Abstract: In standard cross-sectional wage regressions, married men appear to earn 10 to 20 percent more than
comparable never-married men. One proposed explanation for this male marriage premium is that men may
be selected into marriage on the basis of characteristics valued by employers as well as by spouses or because
they earn high wages. This paper examines the selection hypothesis using a “natural experiment” that may
make marital status uncorrelated with earnings ability for some men. We compare the estimated marriage
premium between white men whose first marriages are followed by a birth within seven months and other
married white men in the United States. Married men with a premarital conception generally have a lower
return to marriage than other married men. Our results suggest that a substantial portion of the marriage
premium is due to selection.
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1.  Introduction
Research on the determinants of wages has found that married men appear to earn more than
comparable single men (e.g., see Korenman and Neumark 1991).  Traditional estimates of this
return to marriage range from 10 to 40 percent and have motivated several studies of its causes.
Proposed explanations for the male marriage premium include employer discrimination and
productivity differences due to specialization afforded by marriage.  Selection bias may also
account for the return to marriage.  Women may select spouses in part on the basis of
characteristics that employers also value but are unobservable to econometricians, and the
measured marriage premium may simply reflect the return to these characteristics.  Estimates of
the marriage premium may also suffer from selection bias if men who have high wages or faster
wage growth are more likely to marry.
In this paper we exploit a quasi-natural experiment in marriage to correct for selection
bias in estimates of the male marriage premium.  A natural experiment that randomly assigns
treatment status can be used to obtain unbiased estimates of the effect of treatment when
traditional estimates are subject to endogeneity bias because of selection or omitted variables
(Meyer 1995).  As discussed by Angrist (1995), traditional estimates may give the effect of
treatment on the treated, or the selected average treatment effect, instead of the effect of
treatment on the entire population, or the average treatment effect.  Usual estimates of the effect
of marriage on wages estimate the return to marriage among married men;  if variation in marital
status is not random, unmarried men might not earn the same premium if they married.
Our natural experiment uses the dates of first marriage and children’s births to examine
whether the return to marriage differs between men who have a child within seven months of2
marriage and other married men.  We assume that nonmarital conceptions followed by marriage,
or “shotgun weddings,” make marriage a random event.  If so, shotgun weddings allow
econometricians to avoid the selection issues associated with traditional estimates of the male
marriage premium.  About 14 percent of first marriages for white men are followed by a birth
within seven months in our data, which are from the National Longitudinal Survey.
We also explore whether wages affect men’s marital status.  If high-earning men are
more likely to marry, as posited by Becker (1976), estimates of the marriage premium that do not
control for the endogeneity of marriage will be biased upwards.  Research on the relationship
between the availability of “marriageable” men and women’s marriage patterns indicates that
men’s average earnings and employment rates are positively correlated with the incidence of
marriage among women in the U.S. (Lichter, LeClere and McLaughlin 1991).  Since women
may be reluctant to marry low earners, men’s earnings may affect their own marital status as
well.  To address this issue, we estimate the effect of men’s wages on the likelihood of marriage
using both cross-sectional and panel data techniques.
Our cross-sectional results indicate that married men without a premarital conception
receive an immediate positive wage premium, while married men with a premarital conception
receive a positive return to marriage over time before controlling for individual heterogeneity.
When individual heterogeneity is controlled for using fixed effects, the estimates generally fail to
indicate a marriage premium.  Other results indicate that higher-wage men are more likely to get
married.  Selection bias therefore appears to play a substantial role in traditional estimates of the
marriage premium.3
2.  Summary of the Literature
Although almost all previous research finds a significant return to marriage for men in cross-
sectional wage regressions, studies using panel data have reached differing conclusions on
whether selection bias contributes to the male marriage premium.
Korenman and Neumark (1991) find little evidence that selection into marriage biases
estimates of the marriage premium.  Their specifications using pooled cross-sectional data from
the National Longitudinal Survey (NLS) Young Men Cohort indicate a positive correlation
between marriage and wages.  When individual fixed effects are included to control for
unobservable, time-invariant characteristics, the estimated return to marriage is substantially
lower but remains positive and significant.  They also find that the return to marriage increases
with marital duration.  Korenman and Neumark indicate that young men with high wages or high
wage growth rates in the NLS data are not more likely to get married.
Nakosteen and Zimmer (1997), in contrast, find that men with high earnings are more
likely to get married and less likely to get divorced.  Using panel data from the Panel Survey of
Income Dynamics (PSID), they estimate standard earnings regressions and then include the
residuals and predicted earnings in probability regressions of whether men married or divorced.
They conclude that single men with higher earnings residuals are more likely to get married,
while married men with higher predicted earnings are less likely to get divorced.
In an earlier paper, Nakosteen and Zimmer (1987) control for selection bias using a
Heckman-style selection correction model.  The model is identified by assuming that family
background variables affect selection into marriage but not wages.  Using cross-sectional data
from the PSID, they find that the correlation between marriage and earnings is positive but not
significant when selection is controlled for.  However, the selection correction term is not4
significant in the second-stage regressions and the standard errors on the estimated marriage
coefficients are large, suggesting that the results have no clear interpretation.
Cornwell and Rupert (1997) conclude that selection underlies the marriage premium.
They include random and fixed individual effects in wage regressions using NLS data from
1971, 1976, 1978 and 1980.  They find that any return to marriage is an intercept shift rather than
a return to marriage over time, and controlling for fixed individual characteristics attenuates the
marriage premium.  Cornwell and Rupert also report that men who marry between 1971 and
1980 already receive a marriage premium in 1971, so it appears that men who get married have
characteristics that earn positive returns in the labor market even before marriage.
Gray (1997) pools data from the NLS and the follow-up National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth (NLSY) to examine changes in the marriage premium between the two sample time
periods.  Like Blackburn and Korenman (1994), Gray reports a significant decrease in the
marriage premium over time.  His results indicate that the marriage premium in the first sample
period resulted from the productivity effects of marriage.  In the later sample period, the
marriage premium disappears when selection is controlled for with individual fixed effects.
Research has also reached differing conclusions on whether productivity differentials
contribute to the marriage premium.  Loh (1996) finds no evidence that increased specialization
between household and nonhousehold production, as measured by wives’ labor force
participation, underlies the return to marriage.  Daniel (1995) reports, in contrast, that the
marriage premium falls as wives’ hours of work increase.  Using payroll records from a large
U.S. manufacturing firm, Korenman and Neumark (1991) find that married men receive higher
performance ratings and work in higher job grades.  The marriage premium disappears when
controlling for these two factors, suggesting that married men may be more productive than5
single men.  Absent direct data on workers’ productivity, the interaction of marriage,
productivity and wages is unlikely to be resolved.
We attempt to better understand the role of selection in the return to marriage.  In doing
so, our study differs from previous research.  We examine only the transition to men’s first
marriage in order to obtain clear estimates of the effect of getting married on men’s wages.
Earlier research has included divorced and remarried men, but the implications of the selection
and productivity hypotheses are not clear for divorce or remarriage for several reasons.  Alimony
and child support payments may motivate divorced men to earn higher wages.  Divorce implies
negative selection by the first spouse, and the presence of an ex-spouse and dependents may
affect selection into subsequent marriages.  In addition, divorced men should retain any human
capital they acquired through specialization within marriage.
Our natural experiment approach, not previously used in this literature, tests whether
selection bias contributes to the marriage premium.  In addition, we test whether wages affect the
likelihood of marriage using probability and hazard rate models to see if marital status should be
viewed as endogenous in a wage equation.  By estimating the marital status models separately
for marriages with and without a premarital conception, we also test our assumption that
marriages with a premarital conception are unrelated to men’s earnings.
3.  Empirical Methodology
Estimates of the male marriage premium may be subject to selection bias because employers and
potential spouses value the same characteristics or because only high-earning men get married.
If uncorrected, both sources of selection bias would lead to an overestimate of the marriage
premium.6
The first potential source of selection bias is that employers and spouses value the same
characteristics in men, and the estimated marriage premium in cross-sectional data reflects the
return to these characteristics, which econometricians do not observe.  More formally, the true
model of wages is
ln Wageit = a + bXit + gMit + dAit + eit, (1)
where  Xit is observable characteristics of individual i at time t, Mit is an indicator of marital
status, and Ait is unobservable characteristics that affect wages.  If Ait and Mit are positively
correlated, then the estimated coefficient on Mit will also measure the return to Ait and be biased
upward.  For example, loyalty and dependability are likely to be positively correlated with wages
and marital status.
The standard correction, as in Korenman and Neumark (1991), is to assume that Ait is
fixed over time.  Then, using panel data, unobservable characteristics can be controlled for by
differencing observations from individual means or by including an individual fixed effect:
ln Wageit = a + bXit + gMit + dAi + eit,  (2)
where Ai is a fixed effect for individual i.
The fixed effects methodology does not correct for bias due to unobservable
characteristics that are correlated with marital status but not time-invariant.  It also does not
correct for the other possible source of selection bias, that selection into marriage depends on
wages or wage growth.  If men are selected into marriage on the basis of wages, then Wageit and7
Mit are interdependent and the estimated coefficient on the marriage variable will be biased
upward if high earnings or fast wage growth increase the likelihood of marriage.  The standard
corrections for the endogeneity problem are instrumental variables estimation or a Heckman-
style selection correction method.  Both methods require that marital status be well correlated
with at least one variable that is uncorrelated with the error term in equation (1).  However, few
variables seem like natural candidates for identification;  birth order (Behrman and Taubman
1986), religion (Meng and Sentance 1984), and parents’ education (Ginther 1996; Griffin and
Ganderton 1996) have been found to be correlated with earnings.
Our natural experiment of shotgun weddings offers an alternative means of correcting for
selection and endogeneity bias.  Although the fraction of premarital conceptions that result in
marriage has been declining over time, a significant number of premarital pregnancies resulted in
marriage during our sample timeframe.  Among women who had their first child in 1960-64, 63
percent of white women and 26 percent of black women who had premarital conceptions married
before the birth of the child;  the respective rates fell to 49 percent and 11 percent by 1975-79
(O’Connell and Rogers 1984).
In a true natural experiment in marriage, some men would randomly be assigned spouses
and we would then compare the wages of married and single men.  A premarital conception may
randomly assign some men to marriage who otherwise would not marry or cause them to marry
sooner.  The plausibility of premarital conceptions as a natural experiment depends on two
critical assumptions: that the likelihood of a premarital conception and the likelihood that a
couple marries, given a premarital conception, are uncorrelated with a man’s wages.  In other
words, we assume that premarital conceptions and shotgun weddings are unplanned, random
events.  This implies that women have sexual relations with men that they would not necessarily8
marry at that time.  The women subsequently decide to marry when a premarital conception
occurs.  If marriages with a premarital conception are randomly assigned and there is selection
bias in the traditional estimate of the marriage premium, the estimated marriage premium should
be lower for married men with a premarital conception than for other married men.  If our natural
experiment assumption is not valid, there should be no difference in the estimated coefficients
for the two types of married men; if women attempt to use pregnancy to prompt marriage with
“desirable” men, the results should be the opposite of our hypothesis.
We test our hypothesis by estimating cross-sectional and fixed effects regressions that
include separate marital status indicator variables for the two types of married men, or
ln Wageit = a + bXit + gNon-Shotgunit + rShotgunit + eit (3)
and
ln Wageit = a + bXit + gNon-Shotgunit + rShotgunit + dAi + eit, (4)
where the variable Non-Shotgunit equals one if a man is married and the marriage was not
followed by a birth within seven months and zero otherwise, and Shotgunit equals one if the
man’s marriage was followed by a birth within seven months and zero otherwise.  The
comparison group is never-married men.  The regressions are also estimated with only one
marital status indicator variable to obtain benchmark estimates similar to those reported in other
studies.9
4.  Data
We use data from the NLS Young Men Cohort to examine the correlation between marriage and
wages.  The NLS is a longitudinal data set that followed a group of young men aged 14-24 in
1966 for fifteen years.  The data set includes the date men’s present marriage began and
children’s birth dates, which allow us to determine whether a marriage was shortly followed by a
birth.  We define a premarital conception that results in marriage, or a legitimated birth, as a
marriage that is followed by a birth within seven months.  Of course, not all legitimated births
are the outcome of a shotgun marriage since the marriage may have already been planned before
the pregnancy began or was realized.  In addition, the pregnancy may have been planned to bring
about the marriage because the man is a desirable spouse, a possibility that we address below.
We use data from the 1970 and 1976 waves of the NLS and restrict the data to white men
who had completed their schooling by 1970 and who had complete records for the variables used
in the empirical analysis.  The NLS data set was also used in Korenman and Neumark (1991) and
Cornwell and Rupert (1997), but we use focus on earlier survey waves than previous research
because most shotgun marriages occur when men are in their teens or early twenties.  In addition,
using earlier waves yields more transitions into the first marriage.  Transitions involving divorce
and remarriage, not first marriages, primarily identify Korenman and Neumark and Cornwell and
Rupert’s fixed effects estimates.
Only men who have never been married or who are presently in their first marriage (with
spouse present) are included in the sample.  We drop those men who divorced, separated, were
widowed, or whose spouse is not present because of difficulties in determining whether these
men had a premarital conception that resulted in marriage.  As discussed above, the applicability10
of the selection hypothesis is unclear for men who divorce or remarry.  The final sample size is
530 out of the 5225 records in the NLS.
Table 1 gives descriptive statistics for the sample stratified by marital status in 1970.
There are several clear differences between the groups.  Never-married men earn less and are
younger than married men.  Married men with a premarital conception earn less than other
married men, have less schooling and have been married longer.  Men with a premarital
conception married at younger ages than other men.
A considerable fraction of the men who were single in 1970 married during the six-year
sample timeframe.  Over 65 percent of single men in our sample married for the first time during
the six-year period; the fixed effects estimates will be identified from these men since we do not
include men who were divorced or separated.  About 9 percent of the men who married during
the sample period had a child within seven months of marriage, allowing us to combine the
fixed-effects and natural experiment methodologies.
As in previous research, we include variables measuring the number of years of marriage
and its square as well as marital status indicator variables in some specifications of equations (3)
and (4).  The indicator variables capture the immediate effect of marriage on wages and are
equivalent to an intercept shift, while the years married variables capture the effect of marriage
over time.  A positive correlation between years married and wages suggests that the marriage
premium is due to productivity differences because specialization and human capital
accumulation are gradual processes;  a positive correlation between the dummy variable and
wages is consistent with selection or discrimination underlying the marriage premium since these
causes should shift the intercept rather than have a gradual effect.11
The equations estimated also contain annual weeks worked, weekly hours, tenure in years
and its square, and dummy variables for residence in the South, residence in an urban area,
whether wages are set by collective bargaining, armed forces service, highest grade completed (5
categories), industry (11), occupation (8), year of birth (12) and sample year (2).  Unlike some
previous research, we do not include a dummy variable for the presence of nonspouse
dependents because all married men with a premarital conception have a nonspouse dependent.
All of the standard errors are White-corrected for individual-specific heteroscedasticity.
5.  Results
The estimation results indicate a large positive return to marriage for white men.  Panel A of
Table 2 shows the estimated coefficients of the indicator variables of marital status in the wage
regressions.  To conserve space, we only report the coefficients on the marriage variables.  The
first column reports the results of estimating equation (3) with only one marital status indicator
variable.  Married white men earn about 19 percent more than never-married white men, and the
estimate is significant at the 0.01 level.  This estimate is slightly larger than other estimates of
the marriage premium using the NLS data because we use an earlier timeframe and restrict the
sample to never-married men and men currently in their first marriage.
Column 4 of Table 2 shows the results of including individual fixed effects in the
regression.  The estimated coefficient for white men falls by about one-half when time-invariant
individual characteristics are controlled for.  The results indicate a marriage premium of 9.6
percent when individual fixed effects are included, and the estimate is statistically significant
only at the 0.08 level.  The large decline in the marriage premium when time-invariant
characteristics are controlled for is consistent with the selection hypothesis.12
The results in panel A of Table 2 provide limited support for our hypothesis that married
men with a premarital conception have a lower return to marriage than other married men.  In the
pooled cross sections, white men without a premarital conception earn a marriage premium of
20.1 percent, and white men with a premarital conception earn a marriage premium of 18.9
percent.  However, the estimated standard errors are large enough that the two estimates are not
statistically distinguishable.  In the fixed effects estimates, white men without a premarital
conception have a marriage premium of about 10 percent (p-value 0.08).  The marriage premium
for white men with a premarital conception is not statistically different from zero and is about
three-fifths the magnitude of the estimate for other married men;  however, the two estimates are
not statistically different from each other at conventional levels.  The decline in the estimates of
the marriage premium when fixed effects are included is again consistent with the selection
hypothesis.
The specifications that include the years married variables as well as a marital status
indicator variable also show a positive return to marriage in the pooled cross-sectional
regressions.  Panel B of Table 2 shows the estimated coefficients of the marriage indicator
variable and the years married and its square variables.  The intercept shift and return to each
additional year of marriage are positive and significant for white married men when the two
types of marriages are combined.  Evaluated at the sample mean of 5 years of marriage, married
white men earn about 20.6 percent more than never-married men, which is similar to the estimate
reported in the first column of panel A of Table 2.
When the fixed effects are included, the estimated return to marriage is not significantly
different from zero when the two married types are pooled.  As column 4 of panel B shows, there
is neither a significant intercept shift nor a significant return to each year of marriage.  These13
results indicate that time-invariant individual characteristics play a role in determining both
marital status and wages, and failure to control for this leads to an overestimate of the returns to
marriage.  Cornwell and Rupert (1997) report similar findings, whereas Korenman and Neumark
(1991) and Gray (1997) find a positive marriage premium even after including fixed effects in
the NLS data.  This discrepancy can be attributed to the inclusion of an earlier survey wave and
to the exclusion of divorced and remarried men from our sample.
The results in panel B of Table 2 suggest some differences in the returns to marriage
between married men with a premarital conception and other married men.  In the pooled cross-
sectional regressions, married white men without a premarital conception experience an intercept
shift of 15.7 percent but have no significant return to each additional year of marriage.  Married
white men with a premarital conception, in contrast, experience a marriage premium over time
but not an intercept shift.  None of the fixed effects estimates are significant, which is consistent
with the selection hypothesis.
Our results indicate that selection affects traditional estimates of the marriage premium.
The estimated marriage premium falls when fixed individual effects are included to control for
time-invariant characteristics that may affect both marital status and wages, and there is no
evidence of a significant marriage premium when years of marriage and fixed individual effects
are controlled for.   In addition, married men with a premarital conception, whose marriages may
involve less selection based on earnings ability, earn different returns to marriage than other men
in some specifications.  Married men who have a premarital conception do not have the intercept
shift wage jump experienced by other men.  Any marriage premium earned by men with a
shotgun wedding occurs over time, perhaps due to improved productivity motivated by the need
to provide for the child.14
6.  Further investigation of differences between married and unmarried men
Our results indicate that selection plays a substantial role in traditional estimates of the marriage
premium, but they do not conclusively demonstrate that earnings ability affects men’s marital
status.   Indeed, our natural experiment approach may be invalid;  the likelihood of marriage,
given a premarital conception, may depend on the man’s earnings ability.  We therefore examine
the validity of our assumption that marriage is exogenous with respect to earnings and
characteristics that affect earnings among men with premarital conceptions.  We also use
probability and hazard rate models to test whether earnings affect the likelihood of marriage.
6.1  Are shotgun marriages independent of wages?
The critical assumption underlying our natural experiment approach is that the decision to marry
if there is a nonmarital conception is independent of the man’s wage and his earnings ability.
The small body of research on the effect of men’s characteristics on the likelihood that a
nonmarital conception is legitimated suggests that shotgun marriages are not related to men’s
earnings ability.  Zavodny (1998) finds that white men’s employment status and educational
attainment do not significantly affect the likelihood of legitimation in a sample from the NLS.
Marsiglio (1987) reports that the educational attainment of men’s parents, which is likely to be
correlated with men’s earnings ability, does not affect the likelihood of legitimation among
adolescent fathers in the NLS.  Marsiglio also finds that poverty status does not affect the
probability that young white fathers marry within 12 months of conception.
One method of gauging the reasonableness of our assumption is to compare wages and
other characteristics at the time of marriage between men with a premarital pregnancy and other15
men.  Table 3 shows the mean wage, age and years of completed schooling at the time of
marriage for married men in our NLS sample.  The sample used in Table 3 includes only men
who married in 1966 or later because the NLS began in 1966.  If men with a premarital
conception earn more or have more schooling than other men getting married, it might raise
concerns that the marriages are related to men’s earnings ability.  However, there is little
indication that married men with a premarital pregnancy are “more desirable” than other men at
the time of marriage;  white men with a premarital conception earn less, are younger and have
less education than other white men getting married.  All of the differences at the time of
marriage between men with a premarital conception and other men reported in Table 3 are
statistically significant.
We also attempted to compare wages and other characteristics at the time of the child’s
birth between men who marry when there is a nonmarital conception and men who do not marry.
The 1981 survey wave of the NLS asked men the dates of birth of children not living in the
household, and the 1976 survey wave asked the beginning and end dates of up to two previous
marriages in addition to the start date of the current marriage.  We can therefore determine
whether a man reported children born outside of marriage and compare the characteristics at the
time of birth between these men and the men in our sample who married and had a birth within
seven months.  However, only 19 white men reported nonmarital births and had complete
responses the year of the birth.  In addition, complete survey responses for the year of the birth
are only available for 40 white men who had shotgun weddings.  Because of the small sample
size, our comparison of men who did and did not marry in the event of a nonmarital pregnancy is
only suggestive.16
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 report the mean characteristics of men who did and did not
marry after a nonmarital conception. White men who married tended to earn less but had more
education than those who did not marry, but the differences are not significant.  White men who
did not marry were significantly older than fathers who did marry.  Although these comparisons
are not definitive proof that marriage after a nonmarital conception is not related to the man’s
earnings, these results give little reason to be concerned about our underlying assumption.
6.2  Transitions into marriage
Including individual fixed effects in the regressions controls for time-invariant unobservable
characteristics that affect selection into marriage but does not control for the possibility that
marital status and wages are simultaneously determined.  Our natural experiment approach
controls for selection and endogeneity bias if a premarital conception makes marriage
independent of earnings ability.  To investigate whether wages affect marital status, we examine
whether the likelihood of getting married depends on men’s earnings using probability and
hazard rate models.
We first examine whether the probability that men in our NLS sample marry between
1970 and 1976 depends on characteristics in 1970, including the wage.  We estimated Probit
models for white men who are not yet married in 1970, where the dependent variable is one if
the man married by 1976 and zero otherwise.  The covariates included the log of the hourly
wage, age, years of schooling completed, annual weeks worked, hours per week worked,
tenure in years, and dummy variables for the presence of nonspouse dependents, collective
bargaining status, residence in the South, urban residence and armed forces service.  The
standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity.  The Probit regressions were also estimated17
separately for men with shotgun weddings and men with non-shotgun weddings to further test
our assumption that marriages with a premarital conception are not related to earnings.
Table 4 shows the estimated coefficients on the wage variable in the Probit regression.
Columns 1 and 2 report that the probability of marrying over 1970-1976 is positively correlated
with earnings in 1970.  However, there is no significant correlation between the probability of
marriage and earnings for white men who married with a premarital conception (column 3).
These results are consistent with the hypothesis that marital status depends on wages and also
provide further support for our natural experiment assumption.
We also used a hazard rate model to estimate whether earnings affect marital status.
Hazard rate models estimate the correlation between variables and the time until failure (in this
case, marriage).  We used a discrete-time exponential hazard rate model in which the risk of a
never-married man getting married each year depended on that period’s real hourly wage,
employment status, age, Southern and urban residence, current school enrollment and armed
forces status, armed forces service and completed schooling (in 4 categories).  The sample
includes white men who were not yet married in 1965.  The model was estimated for the years
1966-1976, and men were coded as a “failure” the year they began their first marriage and then
were dropped from the sample thereafter.  Because the NLS survey was not conducted in 1972
and 1974, men married in those years were classified as marrying in 1971 and 1973.  For men
not currently working, wages were imputed as zero.  The sample size was 376 white men, of
whom 301 married by 1976 (39 with premarital conceptions).
Higher wages result in a higher marriage hazard except for white men with a premarital
conception.  Table 4 shows the estimated hazard ratios for the wage variable;  a coefficient above
1 indicates that an increase in the wage increases the hazard of failure (marriage).  Higher wages18
increase the risk of marriage for white men without a premarital conception.  For white men with
a premarital conception, higher wages lower the risk of marriage.  The results are similar if a
Weibull hazard rate model is used instead of the exponential model.
The results of the probability and hazard rate models suggest that marital status depends
on men’s earnings.  The Probit model and the hazard rate analysis indicate that men with higher
wages are more likely to get married.  For men with a premarital conception, however, higher
wages do not increase the likelihood of marriage.
7.  Conclusion
This paper examines the effect of selection bias on estimates of the marriage premium among
white men.  Using the natural experiment of premarital conception as an exogenous cause of
marriage, we find differences in the estimated marriage premium for men who married with a
premarital conception and other married men.  Before controlling for individual fixed effects,
married men without a premarital conception have a significant immediate return to marriage as
measured by the intercept, and married men with a premarital conception earn a marriage
premium over time.  When fixed effects are controlled for, men do not earn a significant
marriage premium.
Our results are consistent with Cornwell and Rupert’s (1997) conclusion that selection
plays a large role in the marriage premium but are in contrast with the findings of Korenman and
Neumark (1991).  These results also support Gray’s (1997) finding that increased selection
underlies the fall in the marriage premium over time.  The availability of contraception and
abortion has increased over time, decreasing the number of marriages that result from an
unplanned pregnancy (Akerlof, Yellen and Katz 1996).  If shotgun marriages involve less19
selection on men’s earnings ability than other marriages, then the demise of shotgun weddings
will have led selection to play a larger role in the marriage premium over time.
The robustness of our results depends in part on the credibility of the natural experiment
employed in this research.  We examine the credibility of our natural experiment assumption by
comparing men with shotgun weddings to other men and by estimating the effect of wages on the
probability and the hazard rate of getting married.  Comparisons of mean characteristics at the
time of marriage or birth do not indicate that men who marry in the event of a nonmarital
conception differ from other men.  Hazard rate models for men without a premarital conception
indicate that the marriage hazard is correlated with higher wages, while the results suggest that
the marriage hazard is independent of wages for men with a premarital conception.  Our natural
experiment assumption appears to be valid in our sample, and the results suggest that marital
status is not independent of earnings for men without a premarital conception.
Our findings suggest that much of the cross-sectional return to marriage for white men is
the result of selection bias and time-invariant individual characteristics.  Future research should
incorporate the effects of divorce and remarriage on the returns to marriage and consider how the
selection and productivity hypotheses apply to these men.  Use of additional panel data such as
the PSID should be pursued to further investigate the effects of premarital conception on the
probability of and the return to marriage.20
References
Akerlof G, Yellen J, Katz M (1996) An Analysis of Out-of-Wedlock Childbearing in the United
States. Quarterly Journal of Economics 111(2):277-317
Angrist J (1995) Introduction to the JBES Symposium on Program and Policy Evaluation.
Journal of Business & Economic Statistics 13(2):133-136
Becker G (1976) The Economic Approach to Human Behavior. University of Chicago Press,
Chicago
Behrman J, Taubman P (1986) Birth Order, Schooling, and Earnings. Journal of Labor
Economics 4(3):S121-145
Blackburn M, Korenman S (1994) The Declining Marital-Status Earnings Differential. Journal of
Population Economics 7(3):247-270
Cornwell C, Rupert P (1997) Unobservable Individual Effects, Marriage and the Earnings of
Young Men. Economic Inquiry 35(2):285-294
Daniel K (1995) The Marriage Premium. In: Tommasi M, Ierulli K (eds) The new economics of
human behavior. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Ginther D (1996) Alternative Estimates of the Effect of Schooling on Earnings. Mimeo,
Washington University
Gray J (1997) The Fall in Men’s Return to Marriage. Journal of Human Resources 32(3):481-
504
Griffin P, Ganderton P (1996) Evidence on Omitted Variable Bias in Earnings Equations.
Economics of Education Review 15(3):139-148
Korenman S, Neumark D (1991) Does Marriage Really Make Men More Productive? Journal of
Human Resources 26(2):282-307
Lichter D, LeClere F, McLaughlin D (1991) Local Marriage Markets and the Marital Behavior
of Black and White Women. American Journal of Sociology 96 (4): 843-867
Loh E (1996) Productivity Differences and the Marriage Wage Premium for White Males.
Journal of Human Resources 31(3):567-589
Marsiglio W (1987) Adolescent Fathers in the United States: Their Initial Living Arrangements,
Marital Experience and Educational Outcomes. Family Planning Perspectives 19 (6): 240-251
Meng R, Sentance J (1984) Religion and the Determination of Earnings. Canadian Journal of
Economics 17:481-48821
Meyer B (1995) Natural and Quasi-Experiments in Economics. Journal of Business & Economic
Statistics 13(2):151-161
Nakosteen R, Zimmer M (1997) Men, Money, and Marriage: Are High Earners More Prone than
Low Earners to Marry? Social Science Quarterly 78(1):66-82
Nakosteen R, Zimmer M (1987) Marital Status and Earnings of Young Men. Journal of Human
Resources 22(2):248-268
O’Connell M, Rogers C (1984) Out-of-Wedlock Births, Premarital Pregnancies and their Effect
on Family Formation and Dissolution. Family Planning Perspectives 16(4):157-162
Zavodny M (1998) Do Men’s Characteristics Affect whether a Nonmarital Pregnancy is
Legitimated? Mimeo, Federal Reserve Bank of AtlantaTable 1.  Descriptive statistics for white male NLS sample in 1970
 a
             Currently Married             
Never  No Premarital Premarital
Characteristics in 1970 Married Conception Conception
Hourly wage ($) 2.95 4.15 3.74
(1.30) (1.58) (1.51)
Schooling completed (years) 12.6 12.8 12.1
(2.2) (2.3) (1.9)
Age (years) 21.9 25.5 24.5
(2.9) (2.7) (3.1)
Lives in South (%) 32.3 27.8 22.2
Lives in urban area (%) 68.3 68.0 59.3
Served in armed forces (%) 15.0 23.3 13.0
Covered by collective bargaining (%) 27.5 31.4 29.6
Has nonspouse dependents (%) 4.2 68.0 100.0
Years married -- 3.7 4.2
Age at marriage -- 21.2 19.9
Married in 1976 (%) 65.3 -- --
Married in 1976 with premarital 6.0 -- --
conception (%)
Sample size 167 309 54
a  Standard deviations shown in parentheses.Table 2.  Estimates of the marriage premium
a
                   Pooled Cross Sections                                    Fixed Individual Effects                
Combined No Premarital Premarital Combined No Premarital Premarital
Covariate Conception Conception Conception Conception
A.  Indicator Variable of Marital Status:
Married 0.181 0.183 0.173 0.092 0.095 0.057
(0.029) (0.029) (0.043) (0.052) (0.054) (0.144)
B.  Indicator Variable of Marital Status and Years of Marriage:
Married 0.120 0.146 -0.052 0.067 0.079 -0.037
(0.033) (0.034) (0.077) (0.060) (0.063) (0.156)
Years married 0.018 0.013 0.056 -0.002 -0.004 0.021
(0.009) (0.009) (0.020) (0.014) (0.014) (0.030)
Years married
2/100 -0.016 0.007 -0.184 -0.045 -0.045 -0.098
(0.053) (0.058) (0.128) (0.070) (0.072) (0.189)
a  The dependent variable is the natural log of the hourly wage.  The regressions also include tenure, tenure squared, annual weeks
worked, weekly hours, indicator variables for collective bargaining, Southern and urban residence, armed forces service, year, year of
birth (11), completed schooling (4), industry (10), and occupation (7).  Heteroscedasticity-corrected standard errors are shown in
parentheses.  The sample size is 1060.Table 3.  Comparison of mean characteristics at time of marriage and time of birth
 a
             Time of Marriage                    Time of Birth           
No Premarital Premarital (Nonmarital Conception)
Mean Characteristics Conception Conception Married Not Married
Hourly wage (real $) 2.85 2.18 2.55 2.73
(1.24) (0.87) (0.97) (2.41)
Schooling completed (years) 12.8 12.0 12.1 11.6
(2.1) (1.8) (1.8) (1.5)
Age (years) 22.6 20.9 21.1 22.8
(2.9) (2.9) (3.1) (3.3)
Sample size
b 270 40 40 19
a  Standard deviations shown in parentheses.
b  The samples only include men with complete responses for the survey year they married or the
survey year their child was born.  If a survey was not administered the year of the marriage or the
birth, we attributed men their wage and education in the preceding year.Table 4.  Determinants of likelihood men will marry:  Probit and hazard rate models
 a
                     Probit, 1970-1976                                      Hazard Rate, 1966-1976                
Combined No Premarital Premarital Combined No Premarital Premarital
Covariate Conception Conception Conception Conception
Hourly wage 0.848 0.900 -0.129 1.166 1.205 0.776
(0.289) (0.296) (0.412) (0.054) (0.058) (0.141)
Sample size 167 157 68 376 372 345
a  The dependent variable in the Probit model is one if a man marries over 1970-1976 and zero otherwise.  The regressions also
include age, schooling, tenure, annual weeks worked, weekly hours, indicator variables for nonspouse dependents, collective
bargaining, Southern and urban residence and armed forces service.  The hazard rate model is an exponential hazard, and the hazard
ratios are shown.  The hazard specifications also include age, and indicator variables for Southern and urban residence, current
enrollment, employment and armed forces status, armed forces service and 4 schooling categories.  Heteroscedasticity-corrected
standard errors are shown in parentheses.